The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s: Where do we go From Here? by Kalla, Patricia
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 5
Number 1 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 5
1986
The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the
1980s: Where do we go From Here?
Patricia Kalla
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kalla, Patricia (1986) "The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s: Where do we go From Here?," Penn State International
Law Review: Vol. 5: No. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol5/iss1/5
The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure
in the 1980s: Where Do We Go from
Here?
I. Introduction
The eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) con-
ducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)1 will begin in early 1987.2 Convening over one hun-
dred nations to deliberate current international trade problems is it-
self remarkable; for some time several major trading nations have
successfully blocked efforts to organize a new round.' This agree-
ment to meet, however, marks only the beginning of a complex series
of events. Most difficult of these are pre-MTN meetings at which
initial tactical decisions are made concerning issues to be discussed,
ideology to be adopted, and future goals to be pursued.4 Each nation,
or special interest group of nations, lobbies to have its own particular
interests discussed while working equally hard to prevent antithetical
interests from being considered.
Although a minimum of self-interest is expected, current trade
problems indicate that a failure to attend to any one crucial issue
may trigger the ultimate demise of GATT. Compliance with the
General Agreement has deteriorated at such a rate that some believe
it may have already outlived its useful life. 5 Thus, the task presented
negotiators is twofold: (1) to maintain a suitable level of diplomacy
I. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-I l, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 50 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1984) [hereinafter
GATT]. GATT has never technically come into force. It is applied to countries by the "Proto-
col of Provisional Application." See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 59-85 (1969). The acronym GATT refers to the international body supervising the
agreement as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It will be used inter-
changeably as required.
2. Preliminary negotiations began September 15, 1986. Farnsworth, U.S. - French
Split Over Subsidies Seems to Narrow at GATT Conference, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1986, at
D6, col. I.
3. Wall St. J., May 7, 1985, at 30E, col. I.
4. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT: THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 1-3 (1979) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GEN-
ERAL]. For a description of the problems encountered during the negotiations conducted the
week of September 15, 1986, see Farnsworth, GATT Nears Pack on Trade Agenda, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1986, at P.1, col, 4.
5. See, e.g., Graham, Global Trade: War & Peace, 50 FOREIGN POL'Y 124, 126-28
(1983); Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. OF WORLD
TRADE L. 93, 96 (1978); but see 0. LONG. LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985).
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so that no nation is angered enough to destroy the realization of a
truly multilateral, cooperative trade agreement; and (2) to identify
the structural weaknesses in the legal framework of the existing
agreement and supply the reinforcement necessary to restore order
to international trade. To appreciate the complexity of the problem
one must understand that there is considerable interplay between
these elements. Indeed, achieving a proper balance between the two
is at the heart of GATT's current problems.
Dispute settlement has gained notoriety as one of GATT's
greatest weaknesses.6 The United States and the less developed
countries (LDCs) are particularly dissatisfied with the dispute settle-
ment process and want considerable time spent on its restructuring.7
Those that share their view argue that an effective dispute settle-
ment process is tantamount to the success of the General Agree-
ment.8 There is a certain amount of validity to this argument: the
dispute settlement process is inherently limited and substantially re-
lies upon the parties' good faith. 9 Once the process is analyzed from
a proper perspective, however, its weaknesses fade, making the argu-
ment appear as an attempt to shift attention from more important
matters.
This Comment will examine the GATT dispute settlement pro-
cedure in relation to its operative context. Emphasis is on determin-
ing the true origin of the dispute settlement system's inefficacy. An
overview of historical developments will be followed by an explana-
tion of the dispute settlement law and procedure. Noncompliance
with GATT rules and remedial efforts to correct that noncompliance
will be examined at some length. Finally, the necessity for future
reform of the dispute settlement procedure will be discussed.
II. The Seeds of Disenchantment
The General Agreement embodies the remnants of an interna-
6. See. e.g., Free Trade in Danger of Losing the War, Wall St. J., Nov. 26; 1985, at 31,
col. 3; accord J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 178-87.
7. The LDCs have significant problems with the dispute resolution process; they lack the
experienced personnel to handle GATT affairs, and they may suffer from the long time re-
quired to resolve disputes. REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDER THE GATT AND TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON Fi-
NANCE, U.S. SENATE, ON INVESTIGATION No. 332-212 UNDER SECTION 332(G) OF THE TARIFF
ACT OF 1930 3, 70 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter ITC REPORT]; see also Wallis, Strengthening the
Open Multilateral Trading System, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 45 (Aug. 1985).
8. J. JACKSON, supra note 1; see also Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the To-
kyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L. REV. 145, 147-48 (1980); Reform
of the International Trading System (Especially Dispute Settlement), 84 F.R.D. 590, 593-94
(1980); but see Graham, supra note 5.
9. The GATT rules have several requirements that a nation notify others before it im-
plements trade practices that may negatively effect them. Furthermore, the absence of sanc-
tions and general reliance upon consultations carries a tremendous reliance on good faith.
None have been entirely successful.
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tional trade liberalization system conceived in the 1930s, proposed in
the early 1940s, and opened for signature in 1947.0 Originally,
GATT was but one part of the many-faceted International Trade
Organization (ITO)." Together, GATT and ITO were designed to
implement eighteenth century economist Adam Smith's free trade
theory of noninterventionism.1 2 The drafters believed that compara-
tive advantage"3 and maximum efficiency 4 would reduce trade barri-
ers and promote worldwide economic growth. 5 Alone, GATT pro-
vided a set of trade rules designed to encourage international
cooperation, 6 maintain a balance of concessions and obligations,'
7
and, primarily, reduce tariffs.1 8 ITO provided the apparatus to ad-
minister the General Agreement and numerous other anticipated
agreements.' 9 When ITO was rejected, GATT was forced to fill its
void. Thus, GATT's skeletal framework became the sole regulator of
international trade.2 0  Despite its unauspicious beginnings, GATT
took hold, tariffs fell,21 and international trade flourished. 2
Ironically, these very successes have contributed to GATT's
failures. Increased international economic interdependence produced
major structural changes that individual countries were not prepared
to absorb. Intense domestic and regional political pressures arose for
governments to forestall industrial readjustment precipitated by the
10. GATT was proposed at the Bretton Woods Conference at the same time work was
being finalized on the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development. Together these organizations were to create a new world economic
order. See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 40; ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 3, 70.
1I. The International Trade Organization was to be a standing organization with a vari-
ety of duties. Its primary duties were to include establishing rules for international commercial
and economic activity, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. In regard to
GATT, it was to provide for resolution of the more serious disputes. SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF ST. PUB.
2598, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES 93 (1946), cited in ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 7; see
also J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 35-57.
12. J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 53-57; see Reich, Beyond Free Trade, 61 FOREIGN
AFF. 773, 777 (1983).
13. Comparative advantage refers to the theory that geographic differences in natural
endowments result in a static distribution of advantages. Thus, some areas naturally are better
suited to carry out some tasks than others. Over time, those areas with the best comparative
advantage will take over all production of a certain item. Reich, supra note II, at 777-78.
14. Maximum efficiency occurs when comparative advantage reaches its maximum po-
tential. See id.
15. GATT proposed to achieve this goal by eliminating discrimination via the Article I
most-favored-nation clause, the cornerstone of the General Agreement, and quantitative re-
strictions via Article XI. High tariffs, as stated in the preamble, were viewed as the major
obstacle to worldwide economic growth. See generally 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 8-10.
16. GATT, supra note I, preamble.
17. See generally id, art. 1:1, art. I!:1; 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 65.
18. GATT, supra note I, preamble.
19. For further explanation, see supra note 10.
20. See J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 59-85; 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 1-2.
21. United States tariff rates have fallen from a high average of 26% in 1946 to an
expected low of 5% by 1987. Graham, supra note 5, at 127.
22. Since GATT came into effect on January 1, 1948, the volume of trade has expanded
almost tenfold. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 5.
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free trade scheme. 3 Responses to these internal problems have va-
ried. Sometimes, governments have attempted to draft economic re-
development plans24 that tailor their nation's domestic goals to its
international obligations under the General Agreement. Other times,
governments have acted in violation of the rules, caring little about
long-term economic goals or GATT trading rules;2 5 and sometimes,
governments have designed activities that purposely avoid strict ad-
herence to any GATT rule.
26
The final tack is the most troublesome. That approach utilizes
unilateral and bilateral rule-making, addresses trade problems im-
mediately and clearly, and is easily implemented. Thus, governments
prefer this method and use it most often. However, because it is
designed to avoid per se rule violations and has gained increased ac-
ceptance by the contracting parties,27 it is the least amenable to the
dispute settlement process.
Although the rule avoidance approach causes the most concern,
all three governmental responses are problematic and form the gene-
sis of what Professor Hudec, a well known GATT scholar, calls the
"wrong case" analysis. 8 Simply stated, wrong cases are those which
the GATT system was not designed to handle. The responses are the
result of forcing an evolutionary economic system to operate around
static trade laws. Essentially, all three involve technical violations of
GATT.
A verbal assault upon the efficacy of the dispute settlement pro-
23. Protectionism is one of the greatest threats to free trade theory. It exerts strong
political pressures upon governments to ignore international trade obligations and enact laws
designed to insulate domestic products and industries from foreign competition. Strong protec-
tionist moves have been behind most government actions taken in violation of GATT. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Report of Eminent Persons on Problems Facing the
International Trading System. Trade Policies for a Better Future, 24 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIAL. 716, 724-31 (1985) [hereinafter Report of Eminent Persons]; Hudec, supra note 8, at
153; see generally Reich, supra note 12.
24. The European Coal and Steel Community's response to the decline in the European
steel industry is one such example. It enacted a comprehensive plan designed to alleviate eco-
nomic, industrial, and social problems. See Benyon & Bourgeois, The European Community
- United States Steel Arrangement, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 305 (1984); Dominick, Coun-
tervailing State Aids to Steel.- A Case for International Consensus, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
355 (1984).
25. The United States has been accused of this course of action. See Graham, supra
note 5, at 134; see also Reich, supra note 12, at 790-93.
26. This has become the major method for avoiding rules. There are a variety of meth-
ods used to avoid vague rules. For a general overview, see 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 19. Some
of the most abused GATT articles are XVI, subsidies; XVII, state trading enterprises; XIX,
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products; and XXIV, Territorial Application. See
GATT, supra note I.
27. The CONTRACTING PARTIES was the only institutional body envisaged when
the General Agreement first came into effect. The use of capital letters signifies that they are
acting jointly, in a formal manner. See, e.g., 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 45.
28. Professor Hudec claims wrong cases arise because of ordinary noncompliance due to
economic and political instability, excess demands on the procedure, and inoperative rules.
Hudec, supra note 8, at 159-64.
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cess resulted from GATT's inability to curb this creative trading.
Nonetheless, few countries formally took their complaints about
these activities to GATT. 9 At least two possible explanations for
this exist. First, many nations were utilizing the very practices about
which they complained. Though governments did not like their com-
petition escaping discipline, they did not want to jeopardize their
own opportunities to pursue the same practices. Nations certainly
will not file a complaint against themselves, and to file against an-
other risks retaliation.
Furthermore, some practices are complaint-proof. For example,
voluntary restraint agreements (VRA's) 30 are bilateral agreements
made between two parties under relatively amicable conditions:31 the
exporting country voluntarily agrees to limit its exports to the im-
porting country in return for some benefit. Both parties are satisfied,
thus neither files a complaint. Outside parties who suspect their
trade may be effected by such an agreement cannot prove the cause
of their injury because of the secrecy. No complaint is filed. 32 One
commentator speculates that most international trade is conducted
pursuant to VRA's.33
The second reason for the underutilization of GATT procedures
is that LDC's perceive the developed countries as being beyond re-
proach. Less developed countries regard economic power differentials
as insuperable under the current dispute settlement process. 34 The
result in the Netherland's case3" against the United States lends
credence to this belief. The Netherlands filed a complaint in connec-
tion with United States dairy restrictions. Although the Netherlands
was authorized to limit imports of wheat and flour from the United
States for several years, the proportion of United States trade con-
29. During the 1960s when these new trading activities began to appear, only six com-
plaints were formally filed with GATT. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, app.
30. Voluntary restraint agreements, also known as voluntary export restraints, are
designed to circumvent Article XI (Elimintation of Quotas) and Article XIX (the Safeguards
Clause). They are perhaps one of the greatest problems facing international trade today. Yet,
because they are so popular, little can be done to prevent them. For more detailed information,
see Sauremilch, Market Safeguards Against Import Competition: Article XIX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83 (1982); see also 0. LONG,
supra note 5, at 57-61.
31. There is speculation that some VRA's are not voluntary at all but the result of a
more powerful country successfully pressuring a less powerful country into accepting its terms.
32. Jackson, The Changing International Law Framework for Exports: The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 505, 514 (1984).
33. See deKieffer, GATT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and
U.S. Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317, 324 n.25 (1980); see also Reich, supra note
12.
34. See ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 70; Hudec, supra note 8, at 158; Roschke, The
GATT. Problems and Prospects, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 85, 92 (1977).
35. GATT, Ist Supp. Basic Instruments and Selected Documents [hereinafter BISD] 32
(1953), followed by a series of decisions ending at GATT, 7th Supp. BISD 23 (1959), cited in
J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 172 n.2.
[Vol. 5:1
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ducted with the Netherlands was small enough to render the sanc-
tions ineffective. Thus, in order to avoid a similar situation, LDC's
seek alternate methods to resolve their disputes.
In short, GATT contains the rudiments for a liberalized trade
system. As that system evolved, the contracting parties were forced
to look elsewhere for operating guidelines; however, when interna-
tional trade concerns arose, GATT was the only multilateral forum
available.36 Thus, when the system failed to unilaterally counter the
effects of ad hoc rule-making, nations vented their frustrations by
critizing the dispute mechanism.
III. Dispute Settlement - The Law
The dispute settlement process has worked well for most dis-
putes that have been brought before the GATT,3 7 although there
have been exceptions. Nonetheless, few of the failures were caused
by weaknesses within the dispute settlement process itself. A brief
explanation of the dispute resolution mechanism will be helpful.
Basically, GATT was meant to be a self-executing document
38
used primarily to maintain a balance of concessions and obligations
amongst the contracting parties. There are over thirty dispute-re-
lated procedures scattered throughout the General Agreement, 9
most of which call for efforts by the interested parties to settle their
differences bilaterally. Usually the procedure consists of consulta-
tions between the parties.40 There are instances, however, when com-
pensatory withdrawal or suspension of concessions is allowed by the
complaining party.4"
There is no single, definite dispute settlement procedure found
in GATT. 42 ITO was to have had ultimate responsibility for the set-
tlement of disputes. Nonetheless, two GATT articles are considered
central to settling disputes. They are Articles XXII, Consultations,3
36. See supra note 20.
37. Implementation action was taken in 72% of all completed cases. No action was
taken in only seven of 75 completed cases. But see Jackson, supra note 5.
38. See, e.g., 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 70.
39. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 164.
40. See GATT, supra note I, arts. 11:5, VI:7, VII:l, VIII:2, IX:6, XII:4, XIII:4, XVI:4,
XVIII:7, XVIII:12, XVIII:16, XVIII:21, XVIII:22, XIX:2, XXII, XXIII, XXIV:7, XXVI,
XXVII, XXVIII:l, XXVII:4, XXXVII:2; see also J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 165 n.l.
41. See id. at arts. 11:5, XII:4, XVIII:7, XVIII:21, XIX:3, XXIII, XXVII, XXVIII:3,
XXVII:4. Compensatory withdrawal or suspension of concessions refers to the right of a com-
plainant to withdraw its commitment to levy no more than a stated tariff on a particular item.
The amount is usually agreed upon during various trade negotiations, see infra note 58, and is
contained in a schedule. J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 201-48.
42. J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 164; 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 71.
43. Article XXII states as follows:
Consultation
I. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as
may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting
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and XXIII, Nullification and Impairment." Both articles can be
used to solve any problem covered by the General Agreement."5 Both
also provide for the involvement of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES."6 When bilateral consultations between the parties reach an
impasse, Article XXII permits the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
"at the request of a contracting party, [to] consult with any con-
tracting party or parties in respect of any matter."'17 This section
exemplifies the drafters' stress on international cooperation and dis-
cussion, but falls short of impelling any settlement.
Article XXIII is broader in scope than Article XXII. Before a
party may initiate proceedings under Article XXIII, it must show
"nullification and impairment" of benefits obtained directly or indi-
rectly under the agreement."8 There is no explanation of this test
anywhere in GATT. Despite a body of GATT law that discusses nul-
lification and impairment, the concept remains vague, subject to a
vast amount of discretion by the one making injury determinations.
The leading case in this area describes nullification and impairment
as an impairment that "could not reasonably have been anticipated"
upon "taking into consideration all the pertinent circumstances and
the provisions of the General Agreement" when an action was
taken.
49
the operation of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting
party, consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for
which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation
under paragraph I.
GATT, supra note I, art. XXII.
44. Article XXIII states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Nullification or Impairment
I. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that
the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result
of
(a)the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obliga-
tions under this Agreement, or
(b)the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c)the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the
matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party
or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus ap-
proached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals
made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties con-
cerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in
paragraph I(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES.
Id. at art. XXIII.
45. Id. at arts. XXII:I, XXIIII.
46. Id. at arts. XXII:2, XXIII:2.
47. Id. at art. XXII:l.
48. Id. at art. XXIII:l.
49. Chile v. Australia, GATT, 2d Supp. BISD 188 (1952), cited in Jackson, The Juris-
[Vol. 5:1
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Next, the cause of nullification and impairment must be deter-
mined. If the cause is a breach of any GATT rule by another con-
tracting party,50 a prima facie case of nullification and impairment is
presented. 51 If "any other situation ' 5 causes an injury, the burden
of proof remains with the complainant. Although current practice
indicates more concern with finding a breach of the rules than find-
ing an injury,53 the "any other" language still permits a complaint
against a party acting within the rules for its own benefit. This ap-
parent contradiction adds a confusing twist to Article XXIII
applications.
Minimum procedural guidelines are set out in Article XXIII.
Pursuant to paragraph 1, a contracting party finding nullification
and impairment may consult with other concerned parties.54 If con-
sultations should fail, paragraph 2 authorizes the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to investigate and make recommendations upon request.55
GATT officials discovered from their early cases that reliance upon
these guidelines alone would not be possible; therefore, they estab-
lished a de facto dispute settlement procedure from their own ad hoc
activities.
IV. Dispute Settlement - The Process
GATT's dispute procedure was formally documented in the
"Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Set-
tlement and Surveillance" (Understanding)56 and the annex entitled
"Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the
Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2)" (Annex). 51 The
CONTRACTING PARTIES reemphasized that the role of dispute
settlement is to restore the balance of concessions and advantage be-
tween the parties in dispute. Both documents were written at the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the last major
round of trade negotiations conducted by GATT from 1973-1979." 8
Nine separate agreements, or codes, were drafted at the Tokyo
prudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 754-55
(1978).
50. See GATT, supra note I, art. XXIII:l(a).
51. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 182.
52. GATT, supra note I, art. XXIII:I(c).
53. ITC REPORT, supra note 7.
54. See supra note 44.
55. See id.
56. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev.2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
621-41 (1979) [hereinafter HR. Doc. No. 153].
57. Id. at 641-48.
58. "Round" is the term given to the multilateral negotiations conducted by GATT.
Prior to the Tokyo Round the negotiations had been primarily concerned with tariffs. In the
Tokyo Round, nontariff barriers were the prominent consideration. Rule revisions were also
considered. The Tokyo Round was the seventh in the series. See, e.g., 0. LONG, supra note 5,
at 22.
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Round.59 The Understanding and Annex were included in the agree-
ment entitled "Framework for Conduct of International Trade."
Each code focused on modernizing regulations for specific trading
problems, primarily nontariff barriers.60 A few changes were made
to the dispute settlement process to strengthen its method of opera-
tion, such as recommendations regarding time limits for certain
procedures.
The Understanding retained the panel procedure as the basic
model in dispute settlement. The structural elements remained basi-
cally the same. Elements one and two, notification and consulta-
tion,6 1 are dispute avoidance techniques. Once these fail, element
three, the panel procedure for dispute settlement, is invoked. Panels
are composed of three to five disinterested persons.62 The panel's ini-
tial task is to provide mediation services to the interested parties. If
those efforts fail to resolve the dispute, the panel makes an objective
assessment of the facts to determine whether there has been a viola-
tion of any pertinent GATT rule.
Following its investigation, the panel presents the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES with a report containing its findings and
recommendations. The CONTRACTING PARTIES usually,
though not always, adopt the panel report. 3 Notably, however, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES have limited enforcement power as
there are no sanctions provided for under GATT.64 The complainant
might receive authorization to suspend application of concessions or
other obligations." This final retaliatory measure has been approved
only once, in the Netherlands case discussed previously, and then it
was ineffective.
Element four, surveillance, is new. It permits the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to conduct a "regular and systematic re-
59. Separate agreements are a method used to alter the legal framework of the GATT
because it is too difficult to obtain the two-thirds majority required to amend the provisons.
See infra note 106. The separate agreements are incorporated in the GATT system but apply
only to those parties that elect to sign them. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 16-18.
60. The code subjects included agriculture, subsidies and countervailing duties, technical
barriers to trade, customs valuation, government procurement, and import licensing. REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 4. For information on the Tokyo Round, see generally
Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW &
Poi.'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980); McRae & Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making.
The Tokyo Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51 (1983).
61. H.R. Doc No. 153, supra note 56.
62. Id.; see also 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 77-78; Hudec, supra note 8, at 170-71.
63. In recent cases the CONTRACTING PARTIES have been less willing to adopt
reports automatically. This can be explained in part by the fact that adoption of panel reports
requires a consensus by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which means the losing country can
block a negative report. For a synopsis of the cases in which panel reports have been rejected,
see ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 58-61.
64. See generally 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 65-66.
65. Id. at 66.
[Vol. 5:1
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view of developments in the trading system." 6 This is read to in-
clude any matter on which they have made recommendations. If the
contracting parties' recommendations are not implemented within a
reasonable time, a resumption of consultations and negotiations may
result.67 The aim of surveillance is to exert moral and political pres-
sure on the defendant country.6 8
The 1982 Ministerial Declaration reported ten agreements con-
cerning dispute settlement.6 9 The agreements were made by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES during their 1982 session. All ten
agreements improved or clarified the Understanding but essentially
did little to change the substance of the process.
V. Dispute Settlement - The Problems
Compared to a domestic judicial system, GATT's Article XXIII
procedure appears grossly inadequate. There are no extensive fact-
finding capabilities,7 0 no sanctions, and no prosecutorial powers.
7 1
Moreover, the absence of strict timing principles present numerous
opportunities for defendant countries to delay the process. 72 An out-
rageous example of the potential for delay was the United States'
response to the cases filed against its tax treatment of Domestic In-
ternational Sales Corporations (DISCs). 73 The DISC provisions
adopted in 1971 allowed the United States company to defer income
tax on fifty percent of its export-related profit if it met various re-
quirements. In 1972, the EEC requested consultations pursuant to
Article XXIII, paragraph 1, claiming the DISC law was an export
subsidy prohibited by Article XVI. The next year, 1973, a formal
complaint was filed under Article XXIII, paragraph 2. The United
States countered with complaints against similar tax provisions of
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands.
The United States would not agree to go forward unless the
panel included tax experts. Since the panel had never included
outside experts, a two and a half year stalemate ensued before the
parties agreed to a panel. The United States prevailed.
66. H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 56.
67. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 78.
68. Id.; contra Harris, The Post-Tokyo Round GATT Role in International Trade Dis-
pute Settlement, I INT'L TAX Bus. LAW. 142, 157 (1983) (calling the surveillance function
"an elegant euphemism for helplessly watching").
69. 18 GATT Focus 2 (1982), reprinted in part in ITC REPORT, supra note 7, app. G.
70. See. e.g., ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 72 (inadequate staff and funding).
71. This presents particular problems in regard to voluntary restraint agreements. See
supra note 30.
72. Jackson, Government Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the
Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 5-6 (1978); see also ITC REPORT, supra note 7,
at 71.
73. For an in depth discussion of the case, see Jackson, supra note 49.
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The panel issued four reports on the DISC dispute in 1977./
The panel concluded that the income tax practices of all the parties
violated Article XVI. Because the European practices were actually
acceptable under GATT's grandfather clause, the Council could not
issue a decision until an agreement with the United States was
reached. The Council's 1981 decision 75 effectively required the
United States to repeal the law.
Legislation to repeal the DISC provisions was not introduced
until 1982.76 DISC was finally replaced in 1984; thus, the United
States delayed the resolution of a dispute against it for thirteen
years.
The 1984 Ministerial Declaration emphasized the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES' concern with the dispute settlement pro-
cess.77 It concentrated on the need to establish time-frames with re-
spect to the panel process, the decision on the dispute, and the
follow-up to be given to that decision. It set a firm deadline for the
formation of panels, thirty days, and required panels to set precise
deadlines when requested.
Another problem, in addition to the opportunities to delay, is
that Article XXIII procedures are not coordinated with the six dis-
parate dispute mechanisms adopted by nine of the codes at the To-
kyo Round. This "balkanization," as described by Professor John
Jackson in his treatise on the GATT,78 has been praised and criti-
cized. Whether good or bad, the absence of jurisdictional parameters
unduly complicates the functioning of Article XXIII.79
VI. Noncompliance - The Genesis of the Problems
While the above-noted problems with Article XXIII are troub-
ling, they must be viewed in light of three considerations. First,
GATT is a unique international contractual obligation,8" not a do-
mestic legal system. Therefore, diplomatic and political considera-
tions must be accounted for, and sanctions are not an option. Sec-
74. The case is reported in a series of documents. Those giving the report of the various
panels are as follows: GATT doc. L/4422 of Nov. 1976, 23d Supp. BISD 98 (1977); GATT
doc. L/4424 of 12 Nov. 1976, 23 Supp. BISD 127 (1977); GATT doc. L/4423 of 12 Nov.
1976, 23d Supp. BISD 114 (1977); GATT doc. L/4424, 23d Supp. BISD 137 (1977). These
documents are cited in Jackson, supra note 49, at 749 n. 7.
75. GATT Doc. L/5271, 28th Supp. BISD 114 (1982), cited in Harris, supra note 68,
at 152 n.42.
76. Id. at 154.
77. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ACTION TAKEN ON 30 NOVEMBER 1984 AT THE
FORTIETH SESSION OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, reprinted in ITC REPORT, supra note 10,
app. H.
78. Jackson, supra note 60, at 44 (considering the fragmentation of dispute settlement
to be a balkanization).
79. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 73.
80. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 59-85.
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ond, the GATT dispute resolution system enjoyed relative success in
its early years. 8' Third, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of disputes brought before GATT since the late 1970s.
Those disputes that are technical in nature and clearly within the
confines of a GATT rule continue to be successfully resolved. 82 Thus,
notwithstanding its inherent weaknesses, the dispute mechanism's ef-
ficacy is influenced more by external conditions than by its internal
procedures, or by Professor Hudec's "wrong cases."8 3
The premise that conditions outside the dispute settlement pro-
cedure itself influence its effectiveness finds support in the statis-
tics.84 In the 1950s, twenty-one complaints were submitted for reso-
lution pursuant to Article XXIII:2.85 The following decade only six
cases were submitted to GATT.8' Although that number increased
to eleven between 1970 and 1975,87 the system was still being un-
derutilized. Concurrent with this decrease was the beginning of se-
vere economic disruptions caused by industrial relocation, technolog-
ical advancements, and increased energy costs. Each of these factors
had a substantial effect upon the entire GATT structure.
Increased participation by more economically diverse countries88
led to a substantial derogation in GATT's most-favored-nation
(MFN)89 and reciprocity90 principles. Nations with state-trading
economies9' and LDC's brought to the GATT system of cooperation
special problems. State-trading nations have difficulty harmonizing
with GATT because their ideology is antithetical to the free-trade
81. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-20.
82. Id. at 48, 82.
83. Hudec, supra note 8, at 147-48; see generally Reich, supra note II (discussing the
revolutionary changes in the international economy).
84. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, app. I.
85. Id. at 1-6 to II.
86. Id. at I-II to 13.
87. Id. at 1-13 to 15.
88. Membership in the GATT has increased substantially, from 22 nations in 1948 to 90
today. About two-thirds of the members are less developed countries; five have state-trading
economies. The membership as a whole represents the entire spectrum of economic develop-
mental stages. See id. at app. D-3; Nau, The NICs in a New Trade Round, in HARD BAR-
GAINING AHEAD: U.S. TRADE POLICY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1985) (Overseas Devel-
opment Council, Washington, D.C.).
89. GATT, supra note I, art. I. The most-favored-nation (MFN) clause is the corner-
stone to GATT. It is essentially a nondiscrimination requirement. There are a number of such
clauses scattered throughout GATT, all of which require that goods of any contracting party
be given "no less favorable" treatment than that given any other contracting party. See J.
JACKSON, supra note I, at 249-72.
90. Reciprocity has not been specifically defined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
yet the requirement that negotiations be on a "reciprocal and mutually advantageous" basis
arises in several areas. GATT, supra note I, arts. XXVIII bis, XXVIII, XXXIII (implicitly);
see also J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 241-45.
91. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. ITC REPORT, supra
note 10, app. D-3; see generally J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 329-64; lanni, State Trading: Its
Nature and international Treatment, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 374 (1982). In August 1986, China
petitioned to become a party to the agreement.
94 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
theory explained above. The LDC's cannot survive if subjected to the
reciprocity requirements under GATT.92 Consequently, some GATT
rules must give way in order to accommodate these countries within
the framework of the Agreement. Because these countries are gener-
ally immune from a majority of complaints,93 other countries have
come to expect like treatment.
Additionally, abuse of the various explicit exceptions to GATT
principles increased as countries sought to alleviate severe economic
shifts. 94 As a rule, each exception fails on two levels: vagueness and
obsolescence. Governments have taken advantage of such failures by
making the rules fit their own needs. The result has been a de facto
rewriting of some rules.95 Most troublesome of the several exceptions
are the escape clause,96 the grandfather clause,97 the provisions gov-
erning customs unions98 and domestic subsidies. 99 In reference to the
Article XXIV rule on customs unions, Professor Hudec has said the
"EEC has so bent and bruised this rule that it's no longer
effective." 100
The Carbon Steel case illustrates the EEC's rule bending in re-
gard to domestic subsidies. Economic disruptions severely crippled
the steel industry in several of the member nations. In the late 1970s
when the European steel industry began to collapse, the European
Coal and Steel Community1"' enacted a complex plan that included
setting prices and quantities, subsidies, exchanges with third coun-
tries, and social measures.'02 The plan was probably legal under
GATT. Nonetheless, there were legitimate arguments that could be
made that the preferences given members' steel violated the intent of
Article XXIV as well as the constraints upon the use of domestic
subsidies. In the end, the plan was simply too complex to be ana-
92. Only about 50 out of every 1,000 people added to the world population in the next
20 years will live in developed countries. LDC's have built up unmanageable debts that are
closely linked to export earnings. The consequences of this is felt worldwide. Report of Emi-
nent Persons, supra note 23, at 11-17. See Roschke, supra note 34, at 92.
93. See Hudec, supra note 8, at 152-53.
94. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 73; accord Reich, supra note 12, passim.
95. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 71; accord Hudec, supra note 8, at 160-61.
96. GATT, supra note I, art. XIX; see also Sauermilch, supra note 30.
97. GATT, supra note 1, art. 1:2, 4. The grandfather clause permits historical prefer-
ences to continue even if they would technically conflict with GATT obligations. J. JACKSON,
supra note I, at 264-70.
98. GATT, supra note I, art. XXlV.
99. Id. at art. XVI.
100. Hudec, Graham, Jackson, deKeiffer & Gadbaw, Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
Dispute Settlement, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 129, 130 (Ann. 80) (transcript) [hereinafter
Transcript).
101. Coal and steel were the first two products subjected to a European common mar-
ket. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created by the Treaty of Paris of
1951. Benyon & Bourgeois, supra note 24, at 305.
102. Id. at 307-310; accord Dominick, supra note 24.
[Vol. 5:1!
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
lyzed in terms of GATT's rudimentary rules.10 3
Although Article XXIII:l:c 10 permits a party to file a com-
plaint if its benefits under GATT are being nullifed and impaired by
the existence of "any other situation," the uncertainty of the nullifi-
cation concept makes enforcement impracticable when no rule has
been clearly violated. Under such circumstances, GATT would be
forced to extensively review the political decisions and domestic and
international economic policies of the defendant government. It
would then have to make an international comparative assessment to
determine the causative agent. In the end, GATT would be forced to
pass judgment on a nation's entire economic plan without authority
from any one rule. Because of the complexity of today's economic
structure, GATT is neither financially, intellectually, nor structur-
ally equipped to conduct such analyses."0 5 If it were, it is unlikely
that countries would accept its recommendations.
While the rules have become increasingly anachronistic, sub-
stantive changes have been prevented by the requirement that
amendments be approved by a two-thirds majority of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES.106 Although most contracting parties agree
that change is needed, few agree on what changes to make. There-
fore, the rules remain vague and obsolete, inviting noncompliance.
GATT's goal is to maintain a balance of concessions and obliga-
tions, not to restructure nations. Therefore, it has concentrated on
preventing violation of specific rules. That fact is inherently more
fair in the eyes of the defendant nation; thus, GATT's recommenda-
tions are more likely to be followed. However, this method permits
many potential cases to avoid the dispute settlement process because
the rules are not consonant with modern trade practices.
VII. Noncompliance - The Remedial Efforts
The Tokyo Round was convened primarily to draft new rules
concerning nontariff barriers (NTB's).10 7 GATT has been so success-
ful at reducing tariffs that nations have increasingly relied on
nontariff measures for protection. Imprecision in the rules permitted
countries to avoid formal complaints against them. In an effort to
rectify this situation, the Tokyo Round Codes set out new rules gov-
erning some of the practices.
103. Dominick, supra note 24.
104. GATT, supra note I, art. XXIII:I(c).
105. Cf. Hudec, supra note 8, at 163-65 (discussing "overtaxing the procedure"); Jack-
son, supra note 72, at 7-8.
106. GATT, supra note I, art. XXX:I. Modifying the GATT is difficult because of its
provisional character and rigid amendment procedures. For a discussion of these difficulties,
see J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 73-82; 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 15-19.
107. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 4.
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Unfortunately, the negotiators did not go far enough in modern-
izing GATT. Some of the most abused rules were not updated be-
cause a consensus could not be reached.10 8 Thus, the escape clause 0 9
is constantly used to justify VRA's, which countries claim are valid
responses to "disruptions" in their markets.110 While that may be so,
VRA's still violate the MFN clause, notification requirements, and
reciprocity. Rules concerning agriculture
111 and free trade areas" 2
were also left unrevised.
The Codes themselves, though more specific than the original
rules, are still imprecise. For example, the Subsidies Code"13 prohib-
its a specified list of export subsidies. It also states that domestic
subsidies are permitted, but then fails to define domestic subsidies.
The question is whether the list of export subsidies is exhaustive.
Thus, governmental activities that may be designed to stimulate ex-
ports, such as tax credits or job training subsidies, may be illegal but
cannot be stopped because the law is unclear.
This evasive drafting is the natural consequence of a ninety na-
tion negotiating process. Because GATT seeks maximum participa-
tion in a cooperative effort, compromises ending in innocuous lan-
guage are struck. This hedging ensures maximum participation in
multilateral consultations. Consultations, as viewed by the drafters
and current GATT officials,1' are the key to a liberalized trade sys-
tem. There is an inordinate reliance on diplomacy at this level just to
ensure the parties get through the process.
GATT is a legal instrument," 5 however, and at some point, de-
cisions concerning legal obligations must be made. Most of the con-
108. See 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 59; Hudec, supra note 8, at 198-99.
109. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX.
110. Market disruption occurs when, among other things, there is "a sharp and substan-
tial increase or potential increase of imports of particular products from particular sources."
GATT Docs. SR.17/11 (1960); L/1397, at 15 (1960); GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 26 (1961),
cited in J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 571 n.13. For a discussion of market disruptions, see id.
at 567-73.
Ill. Agricultural protectionism is utilized by almost every nation. Although it is usually
in violation of Article XVI or XI of GATT, the long-standing practice of permitting it has
made it impossible to prevent the more flagrant abuses. GATT has been trying for many years
to place more stringent restrictions on agricultual measures. See Hudec, supra note 8, at 198-
99; see also Estabrook, European Community Resistance to the Enforcement of GA TT Panel
Decisions on Sugar Export Subsidies, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 397, 401-02 (1982) (describing
the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)); Harris, supra note 68, at 164.
112. Following the EEC's success in avoiding obligations pursuant to GATT Article
XXIV, many of the contracting parties have been forming free trade areas. This has become a
most abusive area. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 69-71; accord J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 581-
86.
113. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIll
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; see generally REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GEN-
ERAL, supra note 24.
114. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 65-77.
115. See J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 59-85; Jackson, supra note 32, at 505.
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tracting parties realize this. They also realize that in adopting a le-
galistic stance during the rule-making process, they run the dual
risks of limiting their own trade options"' and alienating potential
trading partners. The result has been an effort to delay the point at
which legal issues are addressed for as long as possible.
Focusing attention on the dispute settlement process has the ef-
fect of delaying legal considerations for as long as possible, short of
completely ignoring them. It directs efforts away from clarifying ac-
tual obligations and substitutes the threat of a trip through the panel
process for an entire legal system. Also, it relieves countries from
advocating unpopular rule changes. Although the law must play a
major part in the settlement of differences,1 1 7 the absence of compre-
hensive norms makes it difficult to determine what those differences
are. Nonetheless, the debate for an improved dispute settlement pro-
cedure has become increasingly detailed in recent years.'
1 8
Legalism and pragmatism are the two classic approaches to
resolving disputes.119 Legalists generally seek a system that permits
conciliation to impasse, then final adjudication by a third party ac-
cording to the rules of GATT.120 Pragmatists generally endorse a
more flexible approach in which settlements are achieved through
negotiation.12 1 Legalists anticipate more predictable results whereas
pragmatists anticipate results more fitting to the parties involved.
The difference is best illustrated by the difference between the
United States judiciary's common law and equity courts.
The United States and the LDC's are the primary proponents of
the legalist approach. 22 For years the United States was the world's
major trading power. During that time it profited greatly from the
more flexible negotiation approach; therefore, the current practice of
working around the rules developed. 23 Only after the EEC and Ja-
pan became major trading powers and a threat to United States
trade did the United States push for the adoption of the adjudicatory
approach.2 4
116. See ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 73; Jackson, supra note 60, at 57. Compare
Jackson's proposition that government officials will not limit their power with the following
paragraph discussing contrary indications. Id.
117. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 65.
I IS. Professor Jackson has proposed an extensive restructuring of the dispute settlement
process. See Jackson, supra note 72, at 13-21; see also ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 73-74.
119. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 68, at 145.
120. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 72, at 8, 17.
121. See 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 84; see also ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 68.
122. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 68, 70.
123. The United States actually had designed the legalist mode. However, a system of
negotiations became the working model in the early years. 0. LONG, supra note 5, ch. IV. The
United States, as the major trading power, felt comfortable with the consultation method.
Hudec, supra note 8, at 152.
124. The formation of the EEC and economic resurgence of Japan transformed GATT
into a triad of economic super powers. Each felt entitled to a less restrictive form of regulation.
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Professor Jackson has offered the most detailed proposal for the
creation of a legalistic dispute settlement mechanism.12 Briefly, he
suggests an umbrella organization with centralized power. This
would prevent further balkanization of the dispute procedure, assure
greater efficiency, and provide for a consistent body of GATT com-
mon law. 2' Jackson's proposal is hauntingly reminiscent of the
failed ITO, whose raison d'etre was to coordinate a variety of trade
agreements.
Arguably, GATT is already evolving into the trade organization
it was to have been a part of at its inception. GATT's supervisory
role over major trade rounds and their subsequent agreements2 7 is
indicative of this movement. By following the legalistic approach,
Jackson hopes to bring this evolution under control.'2 8 He believes
control of trade will make business transactions more predictable,
therefore encouraging investment and reinvigorating free trade. "
An adjudicatory dispute mechanism has been repeatedly re-
jected by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The EEC, Japan, and
GATT officials all prefer the pragmatic approach.130 They are un-
willing to accede too much power to an outside agency, believing
negotiations to be the more practicable solution.13' It follows that
countries that are unwilling to submit their trade practices to outside
review will either refuse to comply with adjudicatory rulings or re-
fuse to participate in the process. Either way, the results threaten the
larger objective of an open, multilateral dialogue.
VIII. Noncompliance - Implications for the Next Round
There is a way out of this debate. The parties can accept that
noncompliance with GATT is the key problem they face, 32 and that
improving the dispute settlement process is one way to prevent non-
compliance. There is another way, however, that may be more
effective.
The alternative is to inject legalism into the system at an earlier
stage. Energies can be directed toward reaching a consensus on more
relevant rules. Once the parties agree to a specific set of rules, en-
Hudec, supra note 8. at 157. However, as the United States began to suffer, it began to ques-
tion the structure of GATT.
125. Jackson, supra note 72; see also Jackson, supra note 60, at 58.
126. Jackson, supra note 60, at 58.
127. See, e.g., 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 80.
128. See Transcript, supra note 100, at 136-38; see also Jackson, supra note 60, at 39-
40.
129. Jackson, supra note 5, at 98-101.
130. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 68; cf. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 75.
131. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 68; cf. Jackson, supra note 60, at 49 (discussing the
effect of a one-nation, one-vote system upon powerful nations).
132. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 68, 69, 83; accord Jackson, supra note 32, at 514;
Reich, supra note 12, passim.
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forcement will become easier.133 Any legal system gains its legiti-
macy through acceptance by those that it regulates. Thus, when par-
ties agree to the rules, they impart a sense of legitimacy that is hard
to ignore. Further, when rules are concise, there is less opportunity
for a government to challenge a finding on legal grounds when the
facts are clear. Under those circumstances, even moral persuasion
becomes an effective enforcement tool.
Success at rewriting the rules will occur only if the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES do three things. First, they must undertake
to establish national trade policies in harmony with the international
obligations to which they agree."" Economic interdependence places
greater responsibilities on countries. Increasingly, more and more
private citizens find their jobs, businesses, and quality of life affected
by international trade." 5 Therefore, governments must formulate na-
tional trade policies designed to give notice to others of contemplated
actions in given areas. This is especially true for the most dynamic
areas of agriculture, textiles, and industrial redevelopment. When
domestic policies are so linked with the international, violations be-
come less likely.
Second, the contracting parties must recognize that the free
trade ideal has been consistently undermined. " 6 Various intervention
devices have been selectively used by even the staunchest supporters
of free trade.13 7 More common examples include subsidies to farm-
ers, 38 aid to steel companies,1 9 and limits on the importation of au-
tomobiles. °4 0 In each case, the intervention has been a necessary re-
sponse to structural change within a nation. Each intervention also
has likely violated at least one GATT rule.
Managed trade14 1 is replacing free trade in some countries. It
helps countries cope with dramatic changes in their economies by
applying interventionist measures in a logical fashion.' 4 ' Managed
trade also gives them a measure of control over external forces influ-
133. See 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 67; Reform of the International Trading System
(Especially Dispute Settlement), 84 F.R.D. 590, 594 (1980).
134. Report of Eminent Persons, supra note 23, at 42 (suggesting governments regu-
larly explain trade policies); see also Graham, supra note 5, at 134-37; Reich, supra note 12,
at 788.
135. Reich, supra note 12, at 788.
136. Id. at 774-75; Graham, supra note 5, passim.
137. The United States has granted subsidies, utilized quotas, and granted tax breaks,
just to name a few.
138. The European CAP program regularly subsidizes farmers. Estabrook, supra note
I ll. In 1982, the United States spent over $20 billion on farm subsidies. Reich, supra note 12,
at 779.
139. Benyon & Bourgeouis, supra note 24.
140. Japan voluntarily limits its exports of automobiles to Western Europe. Reich, supra
note 12, at 783.
141. See id. at 783-84; see also Jackson, supra note 60, at 37.
142. Jackson, supra note 60, at 37.
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encing their economy. Sovereignty is still important. New trade rules
must address this shift in practice and ideology if they are to have
any binding force.
Last, the parties must lower their expectations. 14 3 GATT is lim-
ited in scope to trade concerns and does not apply to all economic
concerns. If the parties want to expand that scope they must seek to
formally coordinate efforts between the IMF, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development,1 44 the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development,'45 and GATT. Also, the dif-
ficulty of working through multilateral negotiations must be recog-
nized from the beginning. It is this very difficulty that makes the
negotiations so important: by working out differences under peaceful
conditions, countries avoid the fiery collision that occurs between
competitors absent such agreements.
Today the parties to the General Agreement cannot even agree
upon the goals they seek to achieve.1 46 This is a fundamental prereq-
uisite to an effective dispute settlement procedure.
It is a truism that a treaty is only worth what its members make
of it. If respect for rules and commitments is eroded, if member
countries hesitate to intervene when there is a breach of the le-
gal rule simply to keep open the possibility of circumventing the
rule themselves, the means of constraint must lose a great part
of their force and effectiveness. 147
IX. Conclusion
As Herman Walker observed in his article on the Chicken War,
"pragmatism is a matter of emphasis; and as emphasis it is neither
preclusive nor incompatible with progressive enlargement of the rule
of law.' 48 The delicate interplay between pragmatism and the
GATT legal framework is an inherent feature of a system charged
with balancing the trade interests of ninety nations. The contracting
parties are aware of this, as evidenced by their debate concerning
reform of the dispute settlement process. The difficulty lies in deter-
mining where the law needs strengthening. To artificially tilt the bal-
143. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 69.
144. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is an international
group of industrial countries. It provides research, planning, and policy services, covering the
entire range of economic issues. See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 10-12.
145. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is an arm of the
United Nations. Most of its members are LDC's. It provides aid to its members in trade
matters in terms of information and negotiating support. Id.
146. See 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 88; Dominick, supra note 24, at 358-60; see gener-
ally Reich, supra note 12.
147. 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 67.
148. Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671, 685
(1964).
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ance in one direction or another could be fatal.
There are flaws in the current dispute settlement process. Some
cases have remained unresolved, 49 others have been outright re-
jected. Overall, though, the process has given disputants an avenue
by which to avoid a crisis. 150 At this level, the dispute mechanism is
functioning well, as a recent increased reliance upon it proves.
There are also flaws in the substantive rules of GATT. Noncom-
pliance has reached such proportions that deviations have essentially
become legalized. 15 At this stage, the rules have become dysfunc-
tional, lending a sense of urgency to their repair.
Some of the problems with the dispute settlement process can
be recitified by a revision of the rules that it enforces. For instance,
in 1982, a panel was requested by the United States to examine Eu-
ropean Community pasta subsidies, pursuant to the Subsidies
Code. 15  The panel report was never adopted because the panel's
findings were not unanimous on whether there were in fact subsidies.
Had there been a more concise rule, the issue may have been re-
solved favorably for the United States. Thus, in approaching the
next round of multilateral negotiations, the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES must concentrate first on revising the rules. If that can be ac-
complished, the pragmatic approach to resolving disputes will itself
be reinvigorated.
Patricia Kalla
149. One recent unresolved case is the "Citrus Case." In 1982, the United States filed a
complaint against EC tariff preferences granted to citrus products from certain Mediterranean
countries. The United States claimed the preferences violated the MFN clause in Article I of
the GATT. The EC has blocked adoption of the report partially in favor of the United States.
See GATT activities in 1982, at 54-55 (1983); GATT activities in 1983, at 42-43 (1984);
GATT activities in 1984, at 36-38 (1985), cited in ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 61 n.l.
150. See 0. LONG, supra note 5, at 84.
151. ITC REPORT, supra note 7, at 71.
152. Id. at 70.
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